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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from conviction in [a judgment of Bigamy, a
third degree felony, following a guilty plea in the Third Judicial District
Court, in and for Summit County, the Honorable IHomer F. Wilkinson
presiding.

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated

78-2a-3(2)(e) and Utah Code Annotated 77-35-26(2)(a).
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COURT OF APPEALS, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.

:

REPtY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

:

DAVID BRUCE GEER,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Cas£ No. 880055-CA

:

ARGUMENT
POINT I
The State cannot raise an issue that the Defendant pled guilty
and then file an appeal based upon the fact th£t the State has previously
consented to allowing the plea then an appeal.

In the statement of

Defendant filed at the time of the entry of the plea of guilty, said
statement of Defendant provided Defendant does acknowledge that he does
have a right to appeal the denials of the Motipn to Dismiss and Motion to
Suppress in this case, said affidavit of Defendant was signed by Robert
Adkins,

County Attorney in and for Summit County, State of Utah and was

accepted by the Court and is part of the recor|d in this case.

Further, at

the time of entry of the plea, the Court was advised of the additional
paragraph acknowledging the right to appeal tl^e Motion to Dismiss and the
Motion to Suppress.

(Transcript, page 43, liqe 18 through 25 and page 24,

lines 1 through 8.)
Further, the argument by the Respondent is frivolous and has been
previously presented to the Supreme Court in %he State of Utah and while
the Court has not made a direct ruling on thi^ issue, the Court has ignored
the Respondent's position and has heard the appeal by the Defendant in
these cases.

Among the cases that have been ^ppealled to the Utah Supreme

Court following a guilty plea with a reservation with a right to appeal

STATE OF UTAH vs. DAVID BRUCE GEER
Case No. 880055-CA
Page Two

is the case of State vs. Stillings, 709 P 2d 348, wherein at the
introductory paragraph of the case the Court acknowledges that the
efendant entered a plea of guilty and then appealed and on appeal the
Respondent argued that Defendant waived his right to speedy trial by
pleading guilty to the charges and argued that a Defendant cannot plead
guilty and then appeal. (A copy of the Brief of Respondent in the case of
State vs. Stillings, and a copy of the Reply Brief of the Appellant are
attached in the Addendum.
POINT II
The facts of the case clearly infer that Appellant did not claim
religious reasons for practicing polygamy.

The State has conceded that the

facts in this case are different than a typical polygamy case in that (1)
the wives of the Appellant have reported the unlawful act to the
authorities "the wives of the Defendant have reported the unlawful acts to
the authorities, whereas in a polygamist situation, the wives do not aide
the authorities in the prosecution of the Defendant"; (2) that the
Appellant actually obtained a marriage license and when through a formal
ceremony, whereas the affiance understanding of a polygamist marriage, is
that a license is not obtained and a formally sanctioned ceremony is not
held; and (3) the wives of the Appellant did not know that the Appellant
had been previously been married at the time of their marriage whereas in a
polygamist relationship, the "wives" apparently know of the previous wives.
(Affidavit of Robert Adkins, County Attorney, Summit County, State of Utah,
pages 24 through 26 of the record.

STATE OF UTAH vs. DAVID BRUCE GEER
Case No, 880055-CA
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The State argues that the bigamy statute is not being selectively
enforced but failed to cite any cases anywhere in the State of Utah within
the last thirty years where a polygamy case hap been prosecuted by the
State, even tend to cite a decision in the case of Potter vs. Murray City,
760 F 2d 1065, (10th Cir. 1985) in their argument as basis for not finding
selective prosecution in this case.

That argument is without merit since

it is clear that if there ever was a case where the State of Utah could
successfully prosecute a polygamist it was the Roysten Potter case and the
State has made no effort to file charges againlst Mr. Potter.
Further, the State admits that Appellant did not marry the
victims as "a tenant of personal belief, the Defendant married women for
fraudulent purposes and did not divorce a prevjious wife before marrying the
next."

(Brief of Respondent, page 17.)

That the confession of the

Appellant was tainted by prior unlawful conduqt of the police and whether
the Court made specific ruling on whether saidl prior searches were illegal
does not justify the Court allowing a tainted confession to be admitted.
At the time that Appellant was arrested, he was advised that his property
would have to be inventoried, (Transcript, page 14, lines A through 11),
because the property would not be accepted in Salt Lake County Jail.

The

State has failed to prove that the property would not be accepted in Salt
Lake County Jail, only the bare assertion of the investigating officer,
Scott S. Mann.

Further, after being told that the inventory search, the

items found including checkbooks and address books were found in the search
(Transcript, page 15, lines 15 and 16 and page 17, lines 8 through 10).

STATE OF UTAH vs. DAVID BRUCE GEER
Case No. 880055-CA
Page Four

Following the discovery of the checkbook and the phone book, the
investigating officer contacted several people who were listed in the phone
book. (Transcript, page 17, lines 11 through 13.) The Defendant, on
November 16, 1987, contacted the officers and indicated that he was willing
to confess (Transcript, page 23, lines 18 through 24), and at that time
made a confession in this case that is sought to be suppressed.
As has previously been argued, it is clear that the confession
came only after the search of the Appellant's luggage and brief case and
contacting various people including one of the victims of this crime,
Debra Syverson Geer.
CONCLUSION
Appellant's appeal is properly before the Court and the case
should be dismissed for selective prosecution and/or the statements of the
the Appellant and the property illegally seized from him during an illegal
inventory search should have been suppressed.

DATED t h i s ^ 2 2 _

da

^ of

^/^l

^f^

> 1988.

STATE OF UTAH vs. DAVID BRUCE GEER
Case No. 880055-CA
Page Five

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I have mailed four true and correct copies
of the above Reply Brief of Appellant to Barbara Bearnson, Assistant
Attorney General, at 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
via jLirst-class U.S. Mail, postage prepaid th^.s J ^ y day of
y*w^g._
1988.

Attorney for Appellant
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Transcript, page 43, lines 18 through 25
Transcript, page 24, lines 1 through 8
Brief of Respondent; Statel vs. Stillings
Reply Brief of Appellant; jState vs. Stillings
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Summit County, State of Utah, pages 24 through 26
Brief of Respondent, page L7
Transcript, page 14, line3 4 through 11
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THE COURT:

And it means that if you had a trial

in this matter, nobody could force you to take the witness
stand and testify.
A.

Oh yes, Your Honor.

Q.

Now, you also understand that the State would

have the burden of proof to the satisfaction of all eight
members of the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, that you
knowingly had a wife when you purported to marry another
one, £o wit:

Colleen Edwards;you understand that?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Are you presently

under the influence

of

any

type of medication, narcotics orfclcoholthat would impaii
your ability to

exercise your firee consent?

A.

No, Your Honor.

Q.

You're doing this of your own free will and

consent?
A.

Yes, I am, Your Honot.

MR. GRAVIS:

There is one additional paragraph to

the standard affidavit which has been added;that Defendant!
does acknowledge he does have a right to appeal the denial}
of the Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Suppress in this
case.

I discussed that with Mr. Geer and our entry of a

guilty plea in this matter is based upon the fact that we
have factual evidence.
THE COURT:

I understand what you1re saying, counsel

1
2|
3
4

A.

Yes. Later on in the afternoon/ I came back

and checked him out of the jail.
Q.

And did you take him to your office that after

-noon?

5

A.

Yes, sir, I did.

6

Q.

And after you arrived at your office, did you

7

have occasion

8

constitutional rights?

to inform the Defendant again of his

9

A.

Yes, sir I did.

10

Q.

And did he indicate to you that he understood

11

those rights?

12

A.

Yes, sir.

13

Q.

And did he agree to talk to you at that time?

"

A.

Yes, sir he did.

15 J

Q.

And did he make certain statements to you at

16
17

that tine ?
A.

Yes, sir. We advised him that we were going

18

to tape record his conversations and he agreed to that.

19

And we proceeded for the next four hours he proceeded to

20

answer questions and advise us and we made a transcrpt of

21

that tape.

22
23

Q.

And during that conversation, did he say any-

thing to you regarding being married?

24

A.

Yes, sir.

25

Q.

And did he make any statements regarding how

24

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE $TATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Plaintiff/Respondent,
Case No. 20480
vs.
STEVEN M. STILLINGS,
Defendant/Appellant.
Defendant, Steven M. Stillings, respectfully submits this
brief in response to point one of respondent's argument, claiming
defendant has waived his right to a speedy trial by pleading
guilty to the charges,
ARGUMENT
Defendant did not waive his right to raise a speedy trial
issue on appeal by virtue of his guilty plea.

The courts are

divided, on the issue as to whether or not a defendant waives his
right to appeal a speedy trial issue by virtue of a guilty plea.
Although the Supreme Court of the State of Utah has not directly
addressed this issue, in the case of StaJte v. Wilson, 453 P. 2d
158 (Utah 1969), the Court was presented with a case in which the
defendant, at time of trial, moved for a dismissal on the ground
that the case had not been brought to trial within the 90 days
provided by §77-65-1 Utah Code Annotate^, 1953 (as amended).

The

court denied this motion and defendant then entered a plea of
guilty.

The Utah Supreme Court heard the defendant's appeal and

reversed on a speedy trial grounds, notwithstanding the fact that
the defendant had entered a plea of guilty to the charge.
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In the present case, the defendantf by motion to the court
on January 4, 1985, requested a dismissal of the charges based on
the state's noncompliance with the Interstate Agreement on
Detainers.

Upon denial of the motion and after negotiations

between the prosecutor and the defendant's attorney, a
negotiation was reached in which the defendant plead guilty to a
set of amended charges.

In his guilty plea, the defendant

specifically reserved his right to appeal the speedy trial and
detainer violation issue both orally before the judge and in the
expiation agreement which was filed with the court.

It should be

further noted that the defendant relied upon the Utah Supreme
Court's decision in the case of State v. Wilson, supra, in making
his decision to plead guilty while reserving his right to appeal
on those issues.
There are a number of courts which are of the opinion that a
guilty plea does not waive all pre-plea errors. This is
particularly true in cases where the defendant specifically
reserves his right to appeal at the time of entering his plea of
guilty.
In the case of State v. Ealy, 451 S.2d 1351 (Louisiana
Appellate, First Circuit, 1984) at page 1352, the Court held "a
defendant may, however, specifically reserve his right to obtain
appellate review of pre-plea errors."

See also, State v.

McKinney, 406 S.2d 160, Cousant v. Hanmock, 580 F.sub 259
(D.C.E.D.N.Y.) 1984), and Nycum v. State, 650 SW.2d 91 (Texas
Appellant 1982) .
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The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in the case of U.S. v.
Berg, 694 F.2d 632 CA9 (1982), likewise held "we recognize that a
plea of guilty does not constitute a waiver of all defenses
available to a criminal defendant.

A guilty plea does, however,

constitute an admission of all facts necessary for a conviction."
A conditional plea of guilty specifically reserving the
right to appeal the speedy trial issue, therefore, does not waive
a defendant's right to have that issue decided on appeal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED t h i s ^ Q L day of July, 1985.

Attorney for Defendant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and correct copies
of the above and foregoing brief to the Attorney General's
Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114,
postage prepaid, this

day of July, 1985.

Robert W. Adkins #0028
Summit County attorney
Summit County Courthouse
P. 0. Box 128
Coalville, Utah 84017
Telephone: (801) 336-4468
Attorney for P l a i n t i f f
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT W. ADKINS

vs
Criminal No.

DAVID BRUCE GEER,

Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH

)

County of Summit

: ss.
)

Robert V. Adkins being f i r s t duly sworn on oath deposes and says:
1.

That he i s the duly elected, qualified, and a c t i n g County Attorney for

Summit County, Utah, and i s the attorney for the State of Utah in the aboveentitled action.
2.

That during the a f f i a n t ' s term a s Summit County Attorney, the affiant

has never been rquested by law enforcement officers or others to f i l e Bi^my
charges, except against the defendant, David Bruce Geer.
3.

The a f f i a n t believes t h a t the Bigamy s t a t u t e i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and

should be enforced in a l l cases where the evidence w i l l support the f i l i n g of
criminal charges.
4.

At the time t h a t criminal charges were f i l e d a g a i n s t the defendant,

David Bruce Geer, the a f f i a n t did not know whether the defendant's practice of
marrying more than one woman a t a time was based on religous convictions or
otherwise.

Whether or not the defendant has or does not have r e l i g i o u s

convictions in t h a t regard does not matter to the a f f i a n t in determining
whether or not criminal charges should be f i l e d .

Such information would be

i r r e l e v a n t to the a f f i a n t in making a decision whether or not to charge a
violation of the bigimy s t a t u t e .

The only evidence that the a f f i a n t took into

consideration in t h i s case, or would take into consideration in reviewing any
bigamy charges, was whether the defendant knew t h a t he had a wife, and
purported to marry another woman.
5.

The f a c t s of t h i s case differ from other bigamy cases t h a t might be

f i l e d , because
(a)

the wives of the defendant have reported the unlawful a c t s to

a u t h o r i t i e s , whereas in a polygamous s i t u a t i o n , the wives do not aid
a u t h o r i t i e s in the prosecution of the defendant;
(b)

t h a t the defendant a c t u a l l y obtained a marriage license and

went through a formal ceremony, whereas the a f f i a n t ' s understanding of
polygamous marriages i s t h a t a license i s not obtained and a formal
o f f i c i a l l y sanctioned ceremony i s not held;
(c)

the wives of the defendant did not know t h a t the defendant

had been previously married a t the tine of t h e i r marriage, whereas
in a polygamous r e l a t i o n s h i p , the

,f

wives" apparently know of the

previous wives.
6.

The a f f i a n t has always been, and i s , willing to prosecute other persons

under the bigamy s t a t u t e , irrespective of whether the those persons claim a
religous b a s i s for t h a t p r a c t i c e , and the a f f i a n t ' s decision in t h a t regard

will be based solely on whether there i s s u f f i c i e n t evidence to convict the
person of the crime of Bigamy.
DATED t h i s / /

day of December, 1987.

Robert w. Adkins^
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me t h i s

. ' 7 ^ day of December, 1987.

NOTARY'PUBLIC, residing a t
My commission e x p i r e s :

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby c e r t i f y t h a t I nailed a true and c o r r e c t copy of the foregoing,
postage prepaid, t h i s

/

/ day of December, 1987, to Martin Gravis, 2568

Washington Blvd., Suite 204, Ogden, Utah 84401, attorney for defendant.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OP THE STATE QF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-v-

Case No. 20480

STEVEN M. STILLINGS
Defendant-Appe11ant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Steven M. Stillings, was charged with four
counts of Aggravated Robbery, first degree felonies, in violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1978), and one count of being an
Habitual Criminal, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1001
(1978) .
Defendant was convicted of three counts of Robbery in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (1978)* after a plea of
guilty on February 13, 1985, in the Second Judicial District
Court, in and for Weber County, State of Utah, the Honorable
Ronald O. Hyde, presiding.

Defendant was sentenced by Judge

Ronald O. Hyde on February 13, 1985, to three indeterminate terms
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah
State Prison.
STATEMENT QF THE FACTS
In April, 1984, four informations w$re issued in Weber
County, State of Utah, each charging defendant, Steven M.
Stillings, with one count of aggravated robbery (R. 3, 199, 276).

On June 27, pursuant to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers,
the Weber County Attorney requested temporary custody of
defendant from the Oregon State Penitentiary (R. 8, 204, 281).
Defendant was transported to Utah, and arraigned in Weber County
Circuit Court on August 20 on the aggravated robbery charges and
an additional habitual criminal charge (R. 15-17, 206-8, 283-85)•
Defendant waived the preliminary hearing and was arraigned in
Weber County District Court on August 31, when the trials were
set for November 20, 26, 28 and 30 (R. 21, 95-104, 209, 286).
The court, sua sponte, moved the trial date up to October 31, and
notice of the amended trial date was either served on or mailed
to defense counsel on September 10 (R. 22, 210, 287).
On October 9, defendant mailed a request.for discovery
to the State (R. 23-24), and on October 18 he sent to the State
and filed with the court a notice of alibi (R. 25-26).

The State

mailed to defendant's counsel an answer to the discovery request
on October 24 (R. 28-29).

On October 26, defendant moved for a

continuance, claiming that he was unprepared for trial because he
was having difficulty finding necessary witnesses and needed a
court order allowing him unlimited telephone calls, and because
the State had filed a late and incomplete answer to his discovery
request (R. 34-36, 213-214, 290-91).

At the same time defendant

moved to compel discovery from the State, specifying in his
motion several items not mentioned in his original discovery
request (R. 37-40, 218-21, 293-96).
On November 2, a hearing was held on the above motions.
The court ordered defendant to file a more complete notice of
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alibi in order to allow the State to provide him with the
requested list of witnesses.

The court also ordered the State to

make available to the defendent the additional discovery material
(R. 51-52, 104-138, 224-25, 299-300).

The trial was then

continued until January 8, 1985 (R. 50, 226, 30£). Defendant
subsequently never contacted the County Attorney's office to see
the material that the court had ordered be made available to him.
Further, the State never received defendant's corrected notice of
alibi, although it was filed with the court (the certificate of
mailing or delivery to the State was never signpd by defense
counsel) (R. 48-49, 163-65, 222-23, 301-302).
On January 4, 1985, defendant moved tp dismiss the
charges on the ground that the 120-day statutory time limit for
trial had expired, and that the State had failed to comply with
the discovery order (R. 53-56, 227-30, 314-17).

After a hearing

on the motion on January 4, the court denied defendant's motion
(R. 64, 85, 156-89, 246, 259, 304, 347). On February 13, 1985,
defendant pled guilty to amended informations charging three
counts of robbery after the State dismissed the fourth count of
aggravated robbery and the habitual criminal charge.
SUMMARY QF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court properly dismissed defendant's motion
to dismiss for the State's failure to try him within the
statutory deadline of 120 days from his arrival in Utah.
Defendant waived his right to a speedy trial and therefore to
challenge on appeal the trial court's ruling by pleading guilty
to the charges.

Defendant also waived his right to a speedy
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t r i a l by requesting a continuance.

Further, the continuance was

not made necessary by the State, but rather by defendant's
failure to serve a prompt and complete request for discovery on
the State, and by his need for more time to contact witnesses*
ARGUMENT

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
guarantees the accused in all criminal proceedings the right to a
speedy trial.

The United States Supreme Court has held that this

Sixth Amendment right is binding upon and applicable to the
states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Wingo. 407 U.S. 514 (1972).

S£SL Barker v.

Article I, Section 12 of the

Constitution of Utah contains a similar requirement.
The Interstate Agreement on Detainers, enacted in Utah
in 1980, is a statutory provision designed, inter .aliar to
implement the right to a speedy trial of accused persons already
incarcerated in other jurisdictions. S£& Utah Code Ann. § 77-295, Article I (1982).

Article IV of the Act provides that after a

detainer has been lodged against a prisoner in another
jurisdiction, the appropriate officer of the jurisdiction in
which an untried information is pending (the receiving state) may
make a written request to the authorities of the state in which
the prisoner is incarcerated (the sending state) for temporary
custody of the prisoner.

The authorities in the sending state

must then make the prisoner available to the receiving state.
Article IV further provides that once the prisoner has arrived in
the receiving state, trial must begin within 120 days unless,
-4-

after good cause is shown in open court/ the tri^l court grants a
continuance.

If trial is not commenced within the 120 daysf and

no continuance has been granted/ the court is required to dismiss
the information or complaint with prejudice.
In the case at bar, defendant claims tljiat he arrived in
Utah on August 17/ 1984.

Although there is nothing in the record

to indicate exactly when defendant arrived/ he was shown to be
present at his Weber County Circuit Court arraignment on August
20.

On January 4 f 1985f at least 138 days later, defendant moved

to dismiss the charges against him on the ground that the
statutory 120-day limit had expired and the trial had not begun.
The trial court denied the motion and defendant claims on appeal
that the denial was in error and that the charges should now be
dismissed with prejudice.

The trial court1s denial of

defendant's motion was correct and defendant is not entitled to
dismissal of the charges because he waived his right to a speedy
trial and to the statutory remedy for violation of that right by
both his guilty plea and his request for a continuance.
POINT I
DEFENDANT WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO A SPEEDY
TRIAL BY PLEADING GUILTY TO THE CHARGES.
Defendant moved to dismiss the charge^ against him on
January 4/ 1985.

The trial court denied the mo^ionf and on

February 13 defendant pled guilty to informations amended to
charge three counts of robbery instead of the originally charged
four counts of aggravated robbery and one count of being an
habitual criminal.
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Although this Court has never ruled on the issue, in
the majority of other jurisdictions the rule is that a defendant
waives his right to a speedy trial when he enters a plea of
guilty to the charges. Becker v. state. 435 F.2d 157 (8th Cir.
1970); Fowler v. United States. 391 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1968);

United States v. Blaunec, 337 p. Supp. 1394 (S.D.N.Y. 1971);
People v. Hocking. 140 Cal.App.2d 778, 296 P.2d 59 (1956); Wixson
v. People. 175 Colo. 348, 487 P.2d 809 (1971); Baier v. State.
197 Kan. 602, 419 P.2d 865 (1966); Petition of Duran. 152 Mont.
Ill, 448 P.2d 137 (1968); Fain v. State. 503 P.2d 254 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1972); State v. Wilson. 25 Wash. App. 891, 611 P.2d
1312 (1980).

More specifically, a number of courts have found

that a defendant waived his right to a speedy trial by pleading
guilty even when he had raised the speedy trial issue at or
before trial in a motion to dismiss.

People v. Iversen. 82

A.D.2d 895, 440 N.Y.S.2d 286 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981); Commonwealth
v. L'ltalien. 3 Mass App. Ct. 763, 330 N.E.2d 214 (1975); Foster
v. State. 70 Wis.2d 12, 233 N.W.2d 411 (1975); Graulich V. State,
287 So.2d 114 (Fla. App. 1973); State v. McGee. 211 N.W.2d 267
(Iowa 1973); State Y. Jackson, 17 Ariz. App. 533, 499 P.2d 111
(1972); Woods v. Rhay. 68 Wash.2d 601, 414 P.2d 601 (1966);

People v. Pritchettr 29 ill.2d 407, 194 N.E.2d 352 (1963).
Similarly, in the present case, even though defendant raised the
speedy trial issue in a motion to dismiss, his subsequent guilty
plea was a waiver of his right to assert the issue on appeal.
The record shows that defendant did not intend his
guilty plea to serve as a waiver of his right to appeal the trial
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c o u r t ' s denial of h i s motion t o dismiss (R. 84, 1 3 8 - 4 4 , 1 4 6 - 4 7 ) .
Howeverf the defendant's i n t e n t i o n t o preserve the i s s u e i s
irrelevant.

In both Foster and Graulich. JSHSXJL, the defendants

claimed that they did not intend t h e i r p l e a s to c o n s t i t u t e a
waiver of a challenge t o the speedy t r i a l i s s u £ .
both c a s e s a waiver was found.
Court s a i d :

Nonetheless, in

In F o s t e r , the Wisconsin Supreme

w

a defendant's expressed i n t e n t tp reserve the i s s u e

of speedy t r i a l beyond a plea of g u i l t y does not change the . . .
rule. . . .

The plea of g u i l t y i s not q u a l i f i e d by the i n t e n t of

the defendant. • . .

The judgment of c o n v i c t i o n stands."

Foster

a t 415-16•
POINT II
DEFENDANT WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO A SPEEDY
TRIAL BY REQUESTING A CONTINUANCE.
On October 25, 1984, defendant moved to continue the
trial date from October 31 in order to allow him more trial
preparation time (R. 34-35).

After a hearing on November 2, the

trial date was continued until January 8, 1985, past the 120-day
statutory deadline for trial.
defendant's initiation.

Thus the trial was continued at

On January 4 Judge H^de denied

defendant's motion to dismiss for failure of the State to try him
within the 120-day statutory requirement, saying:

"Well, you

can't make a motion to continue it . . . and ^hen say 'Aw haw,
you're past the time of the statute.' . . .

I know that you

cannot request a continuance and sneak past the trial date . . .
I will not dismiss under this because you did make a motion to
continue" (R. 172, 176, 187). Defendant now Appeals the denial
of his motion.
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Defendant cites to several cases which state that the
statutory deadline for trial is mandatory and that the burden is
•on the State rather than on the defendant to ensure compliance
with the statute. However, none of these cases is applicable to
the case at bar because in none of them was the delay at issue
due to the defendant's own request for a continuance.

This Court

has consistently held that a defendant waives his right to a
speedy trial whenever the delay complained about is a result of
his own conduct or request.

State v. Velasquez. 641 P.2d 115

(Utah 1982); State v. Bonnyr 25 Utah 2d 117, 477 P.2d 147 (1970);
see also State v. Taylor. 538 P.2d 310 (Utah 1975) (Crockett, J.,
concurring).

In the present case, since the trial date was

continued past the statutory deadline solely for defendant's
benefit and at his request, he waived his right to a speedy trial
and was not entitled to a dismissal.
Defendant claims that he should not be charged with the
continuance because the State forced him to request it.

He

alleges that the trial date was changed from the end of November
to October 31 entirely on the court1s volition, and that he did
not receive notice of the amended trial date until October 5. He
then filed a discovery request on October 9 and received the
State's answers on October 25. He claims that the answers were
so inadequate that he was forced to choose between going to trial
unprepared and moving to continue and compel discovery.

He

argues that at the November 2nd hearing the court ordered the
discovery he had originally requested and granted the continuance
in order to allow the State to comply with the order.

However,

the record belies defendant's description of these events.
-8-

First/ the record shows that the Weber County Clerk
served on (or mailed to) the defense counsel notice of the
amended trial date on September 10 (R. 22, 210, 287). Further,
in both the hearing on defendant's motion to dismiss and
defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities supporting the
motion, defendant's counsel stated that he received notice of the
new trial date on September 5 (R. 189, 232, 306). Therefore
defendant received notice of the new trial date a month before he
claims in his brief to have received it.

Defendant is not

entitled to complain that the State took too long in answering
his discovery request when he waited until three weeks before
trial before serving the request, a full month after receiving
notice of the amended trial date.

Second, in defendant's motion

to continue he stated that he needed more time to prepare for
trial because he needed more discovery .and because he needed a
court order allowing him to make unlimited telephone calls to
talk to potential witnesses (R. 34-35, 104-37, 213-15, 290-92).
Therefore, defendant needed the continuance siniply because he was
unprepared for trial, not because the State had furnished
incomplete or late discovery answers.

Third, the State's

original discovery answer was complete with regard to what
defendant had requested.

The court order issued as a result of

the hearing on the motion to compel discovery involved material
not specified in defendant's October 9 discovery request; i.e.
gloves seized from defendant's car, police broadcast tapes,
insurance reports of the victims of the robberies, a comparison
of the fingerprints found at the scenes of the crimes with people
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named by defendant (R. 23-24, 51-52).

Therefore, defendant's

motion to compel discovery was not necessary to compel the State
to furnish material that had already been requested, but to
obtain discovery of new material, as the court found at the
motion to dismiss hearing:

"Your motion for discovery he's

answered, basically answered.

When Maurice [Richards,

defendant's original counsel] was in here on the last one, there
was new material and I made some orders in regard to it" (R.
189) .
Thus, defendant's need for a continuance in this case
was not caused by the State, but rather by his failing to serve a
prompt and complete discovery request on the State and his need
for more time to contact witnesses.

Therefore the request for

continuance was a waiver of the defendant's right to a speedy
trial and the protection afforded that right by § 77-29-5, and
the trial court properly denied his motion to dismiss.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing arguments, the judgment of the
court below should be affirmed.
DATED this

day of June, 1985.
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
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2
3
4
5
6
7

Q.

Did you have a s e a r c h w a r r a n t ?

A.

No, I d i d n o t .

Q.

What were you searching for?

A.

At that time we weren't searching for anything

We had arrested Mr. Geer at the time at the airport. We
had several large

pieces of items that we were aware

would not be accepted into the Salt Lake County Jail,

8

that were going to h*ve to be placed in the storage room

9

at the Organized Crime Office, We then advised him of

10

this at the airport.

11

to be present while the items w^re checked.

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

23
24
25

Q.

Ok.

Mr. Geer then told us that he wante

But ^ou was hoping to find creditncards

belonging to other people in th£re, weren't you?
A.

Not at that point. We felt like the credit

cards would be on'him andXwe.vWohald discover those.
Q.

But you thought there was a chance that the

items you were really lookin' f^r would be in the suit-cases, isn't that correct?
A.

No. We felt like the credit cards would be

on him, yes.
Q.

And you felt like it, but you didn't.know it?

A.

No, we did not know.

Q.

And it was possible that they would have been

in the-suitcases?
A.

Very well could have been possible, yes.

Q.

Where did you find the credit card of Janice

Rubens ?
A.

In his wallet.

Q.

Did you contact Ms. Rubens concerning the

credit cards?
A.

Yes. Yes, had several contacts before the

case as well.
Q.

After you discovered those credit cards, that

Mr. Geer had permission to have them and use them, is
that correct?
A.

That is

correct.

Q.

And Mr. Geer was not married to Janice RubensJ

is that correct?
A.

Well, we weren't sure at that time.

Q.

Ok. Where did you find the checkbook?

A.

Checkbook was in the briefcase.

Q.

Ok. Now, you were searching and you pulled

out the checkbook and it had David Bruce Geer and Deborah
Syversen Geerfs name on the chebkbookV is that correct?
A.
Q.
A.

That is correct.
And you ever been married, Officer Mann?
Yes, I am now.

Q.

Ever been divorced?

A.

No, sir, I have not.

Q.

Do you have a joint checking account with

Q.

That information is not included in your

police report is it?
A.

No, I don't believe J.t is.

Q.

But you didn't suspect it was evidence of

bigamy?
A.

No, 1 suspected that it was evidence of the

bad check charge in Fulton County, Missouri.
Q. ~: oYtu3££ound a phonebook in Mr. Geer's briefcase,
didn't you?
0

A.

That is correct.

Q.

And you contacted several people who were

I
2

listed in the phonebook, that true?
1

A.

Yes.

Q.

And now, the crime of fraud occurred in Miss-

4

ouri ?you weren't investigating that crime here, were you<|
€

A.

No, sir/

Q.

You merely arrested him and is there any stat-j

7
I

-ute that allows you to impound Mr. Geer's personal prop%

erty at the time of the arrest?
0

A.

What do you mean?

Q.

Take a suitcase and his briefcase where it wa^

1
1

not at that time considered evidence of a crirofe?
I

A.

Well, at that time we flo provide for the cust-}

4

-ddy of that stuff, yes. We had no other place to put it
t

Q.

Could Mr. Geer have put it in a locker at the

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

u
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Q.

And did you do that?

A.

Y e s , sir I did.

Q.

And where did you store those items?

A.

In a locked area in the Organized

Crime

Bureau f s office.
Q.

And on November 16th, 1987 # when you arrived

at work on the morning-of that day, did you have any
phone messages waiting for you at that time?
A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

And from whom?

A.

There were several of them.

There were two

of them from David Geer.
Q.

And did you initiate a telephone call to Mr.

Geer at that time?
A.
. Q.

No,sir.

I went up to the

jail and saw him

And when you met Mr. Geer, on that occasion,

what occurred?
A.

I talked with M r . Geer.

wanted to see m e .

I asked him why he

Mr. Geer indicated that he would like

to make a clean breast of everything and get everything

21
squared away.

He then asked us if we could check him out

22
a jail and take him down to the Murray office where he
21

could be comfortable, and where he could talk and that he

24
would talk with us .
Q.

And did you do that?

